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Jones: United States v. Hinkson

CASE SUMMARY
WHAT’S THE DEFERENCE?:
UNITED STATES V. HINKSON
OUTLINES A NEW TEST FOR “ABUSE
OF DISCRETION”
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to United States v. Hinkson, under the prevailing
analysis used to determine whether the trial court had engaged in
an “abuse of discretion,” there was arguably “no effective limit” on
an appellate court’s power to substitute its own judgment for that
of the district court.1 Rather, it was left to the appellate panel to
decide whether it had a “definite and firm conviction that [a]
mistake [had] been committed,” or whether a trial court’s factual
finding was even “permissible.”2
But in Hinkson, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit took the
opportunity to elaborate on the abuse-of-discretion standard. The
Hinkson court adopted a two-part test that appellate courts should
follow to make an objective determination as to whether a district
court abused its discretion in applying a rule of law to the facts in
denying a motion for a new trial.3 Although accompanied by a
vigorous dissent, the Hinkson abuse-of-discretion test has quickly
become a powerful influence and has been widely cited
throughout the circuit.4
1

United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Id. (citing United States v. 4.85 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Lincoln
County, Mont., 546 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 2008)).
3
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1261.
4
In the two months following the decision, Hinkson was cited in twenty-one
opinions by courts within the Ninth Circuit and in numerous briefs by counsel. See, e.g.,
2

401
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II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.

FACTS

[Vol. 40

Idaho businessman David Hinkson owned and operated a
water-bottling company called WaterOz.5 In 2000, Hinkson hired
Elven Joe Swisher, a water-safety tester, to periodically assess
Hinkson and Swisher eventually became
WaterOz water.6
friends.7 Over the course of their friendship, Hinkson learned that
Swisher had served in the United States Marine Corps as a
firearms expert and that during this service Swisher “had killed a
number of people in the Korean War.”8
According to Swisher, in April 2002, Hinkson offered him
$10,000 per head if he were to torture and kill local attorney
Dennis Albers and his family.9 Hinkson allegedly told Swisher that
Albers had been causing him legal troubles.10
During this same time period, Assistant United States
Attorney Nancy Cook and Special Agent Steven Hines of the
Internal Revenue Service spearheaded an investigation into
Hinkson’s failure to pay federal income tax on WaterOz profits.11
In the summer of 2002, just a few months before Cook and Hines
led a search of Hinkson’s home, Hinkson allegedly asked that
Swisher treat Cook, Hines, and their families “the same way as
Albers.”12 In November of 2002, Cook and Hines executed search
warrants on Hinkson’s home, which led to Hinkson’s eventual
indictment and conviction for tax evasion.13
Judge Edward J. Lodge presided over the tax-evasion case.14
While on pretrial release for the tax-evasion charges, Hinkson
extended another request to Swisher.15 This new offer of $10,000
Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1192 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
5
Hinkson,
585
F.3d
at
1251;
see
also
WaterOz:
About
http://www.wateroz.com/about-us.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
6
Id. at 1251
7
Id.
8
Id. 1251-52.
9
Id. at 1252.
10
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1252.
11
Id. at 1252.
12
Id.
13
Id.; see also United States v. Hinkson, 281 F. App’x 651, 653 (9th Cir. 2008).
14
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1252.
15
Id.
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per head would now include Judge Lodge and his family.16
After several unsuccessful attempts to solicit Swisher’s
services, Hinkson approached James Harding.17 Hinkson met
Harding at a 2003 Health Forum in Southern California and
subsequently offered the former bodyguard a job at WaterOz and
invited him to stay at his home.18 It was during this stay that
Hinkson requested that Harding kill Cook, Hines, and Judge
Lodge in exchange for $20,000.19 Harding refused but was later
re-approached by Hinkson with the same proposal in March
2003.20 After refusing Hinkson’s offer yet again, Harding reported
the solicitations to the FBI.21
That same year, Swisher reported Hinkson’s solicitation of his
On
services to an Idaho state prosecutor and the FBI.22
September 21, 2004, a federal grand jury in Idaho indicted
Hinkson for soliciting the murders of Attorney Cook, Special Agent
Hines, and Judge Lodge.23
A.

FACTS

1.

Trial

Hinkson was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 37324 with nine
counts of solicitation to commit a crime of violence.25
The solicitation case against Hinkson went to trial on January
11, 2005, and lasted a total of two weeks.26 A few days into the
trial, Elven Joe Swisher, with a Purple Heart medal27 pinned to his
16

Id.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1252.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
A person violates 18 U.S.C. § 373 if he or she “solicits, commands, induces, or
otherwise endeavors to persuade [another] person to engage” in “conduct constituting a
felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United
States.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 373(a) (Westlaw 2004).
25
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1252-53.
26
Id. at 1253.
27
“The decoration known as the Purple Heart (authorized to be awarded pursuant to
Executive Order 11016) may only be awarded to a person who is a member of the armed
forces at the time the person is killed or wounded under circumstances otherwise qualifying
17
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lapel, took the stand as a prosecutorial witness.28 On direct
examination, Swisher testified that he had served in the United
States Marine Corps.29 The prosecutor refrained from inquiry into
Swisher’s actual combat experience or commendations, but
instead focused on what Swisher “had told Hinkson of his [Korean
War] combat experience.”30 Swisher testified that, with this
knowledge, Hinkson solicited his assistance in murdering Cook,
Hines, and Judge Lodge.31
After cross-examining Swisher and attacking his credibility
with inconsistencies in his testimony, Hinkson’s attorney asked for
a sidebar conference.32 Hinkson’s attorney indicated that Swisher
could not have served in the Korean War as he would only have
been 13 to 16 years old at the time.33 Hinkson’s attorney then
presented to the court a letter he had received that morning from
Bruce Tolbert, an archives technician with the National Personnel
Records Center (Tolbert Letter).34 The Tolbert Letter stated that
Swisher’s official military records did not indicate any honorable
decorations such as the Purple Heart.35

Hinkson’s attorney moved to re-open cross-examination in
order to question Swisher on his military service and more
specifically on the pin adorning his lapel.36 The prosecution
objected, arguing that direct examination was limited to what
Hinkson was told and not Swisher’s actual service nor his
commendations.37 When the court granted the defense’s request
to re-open the cross examination of Swisher, the prosecution

that person for award of the Purple Heart.” 10 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (Westlaw 2010).
28
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1253.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 1253-54.
33
The Korean War lasted from 1950-1953. Swisher was born in 1937 and therefore
was only 13-16 years old during the Korean War.
34
The National Personnel Records Center (NPCR) maintains the official military
record of those in the Armed Forces. NPCR maintains the official military record of
deceased and discharged veterans of the Armed Forces. The National Archives, Military
Personnel Records, http://www.archives.gov/st-louis/military-personnel/ (last visited Apr.
23, 2010).
35
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1254.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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warned Hinkson’s attorney not to “go there.”38 When crossexamination resumed, Swisher testified that he was awarded the
Purple Heart by the United States military and, following the
Korean War, he served on classified missions to free prisoners
from secret North Korean prison camps.39
Hinkson’s attorney then placed the Tolbert Letter before
Swisher and asked him if he did in fact receive the Purple Heart.40
Swisher answered “yes” and presented a piece of paper entitled
“Replacement DD-214.”41 The form stated that Swisher was
entitled to wear the Purple Heart because he was injured by
shrapnel in combat.42 The Replacement DD-214 was dated
October 1957 and stamped certified by a Captain W.J.
Woodring.43 The court then learned that the prosecution had
already known of the Replacement DD-214.44 After denying the
defense’s motion for a mistrial, the court instructed the jury to
“disregard completely all of Mr. Swisher’s testimony with regard to
that military commendation.”45

Seven days after Swisher took the stand, Hinkson’s lawyer
brought forth a letter from Lt. Col. K.G. Dowling of the National
Personnel Management Support Branch of the United States
Marine Corps (Dowling Letter).46
The Dowling Letter was
addressed to Ron Keeley of the Idaho Veterans Affairs Services.47
It stated that Swisher had tried to use the Replacement DD-214 to
obtain benefits and that the Dowling Letter was a response to

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1254. The DD-214 Form is also known as a Report of
Separation. It is routinely used to verify military service for the purposes of benefits,
retirement, employment, and membership in veterans’ organizations. Information contained
in this report may include the service member’s period of service, type of duty, rank,
medals, awards, commendations, and any foreign tours. The National Archives, DD Form
214,
Discharge
Papers
and
Separation
Documents,
http://www.archives.gov/veterans/military-service-records/dd-214.html (last visited Apr. 23,
2010).
42
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1254-55.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1255.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
39
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Keeley’s inquiry into the form’s authenticity.48 The Dowling Letter
stated that the medals listed in the Replacement DD-214 were not
contained in Swisher’s official file.49 The letter went on to state
that several of the medals contained in the Replacement DD-214
form did not even exist at the time it was dated.50
Swisher’s military record was subsequently subpoenaed and
reviewed in camera.51 The file contained a Replacement DD-214
Form identical to Swisher’s proffered copy except that it did not list
any medals or commendations.52 But the file also contained a
letter from Captain Woodring, the officer who certified Swisher’s
version of the DD-214, stating Swisher was authorized to wear the
Purple Heart and other medals.53
The court informed the parties that the record appeared to
support Swisher’s claims that he was involved in top-secret
assignments and was awarded various commendations.54
However, the court also noted that the record was complex and
difficult to decipher, and that the documents were not selfauthenticating or self-explanatory.55 The court emphasized that
testimony from the custodian of records as to the complex military
file or Captain Woodring as to the authenticity of the DD-214 form
would be required to authenticate it as admissible evidence.56
But instead of requesting a continuance to procure such
testimony, Hinkson’s attorney instead moved to admit Swisher’s
military file and the Dowling letter into evidence.57 The court then
denied both pieces of proffered evidence on the grounds that they
were inadmissible under Rules 40358 and 608(b)59 of the Federal
48

Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1255.
Id.
50
Id. at 1255-56.
51
Id. at 1256.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1256.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
FED. R. EVID. 403 provides as follows:
49

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
59

FED. R. EVID. 608(b) states as follows:

Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
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Rules of Evidence60 as mere extrinsic evidence that would serve
no purpose other than to attack Swisher’s character for
truthfulness.61 The court noted that the evidence would distract
and confuse the jury and ultimately be a waste of time.62 Hinkson
was subsequently convicted for soliciting Swisher to murder Cook,
Hines, and Judge Lodge.63
2.

Post-Trial

Based on new evidence, Hinkson made a motion for a new
trial.64 Hinkson offered a letter from Chief Warrant Officer W.E.
Miller (Miller Affidavit).65 Miller, the liaison to the National
Personnel Records Center, stated that the Replacement DD-214
form offered by Swisher was forged and that Swisher’s injuries
were the result of a civilian car accident rather than military
combat.66 Hinkson also provided an affidavit from Captain
Woodring (Woodring Affidavit).67 In the affidavit, Woodring stated
that he never signed the Replacement DD-214 nor did he submit
the Woodring Letter located in Swisher’s military record.68
Reviewing the motion and the evidence in light of the factors
identified in United States v. Harrington,69 the trial judge denied
the motion for a new trial.70 In the order denying the motion, the
trial judge outlined his findings of facts that led him to conclude
that Hinkson failed to meet the requirements of the Harrington
test.71
supporting the witness’ character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as
provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however,
in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness
being cross-examined has testified.
60

Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1256.
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 1257.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1257.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1257; see United States v. Harrington, 410 F.3d 598 (9th Cir.
2005). For a discussion of the Harrington test, see infra Part III(B)(1).
70
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1257.
71
Id.
61
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The lower court came to the conclusion that the evidence
offered in support of the motion was not “newly discovered.”72
Rather, the trial judge found that the Woodring and Miller affidavits
offered nothing substantively different from the evidence available
at trial.73 The trial court noted that Hinkson’s lawyer mentioned
that he had been investigating Swisher’s military record for “quite
some time” because Swisher’s birth date made it doubtful that he
had served in the Korean War.74 The trial judge also highlighted
the fact that, months prior to the criminal trial, defense counsel
represented Hinkson in a civil suit against Swisher.75
The trial court went on to state that, prior to the criminal case
going to trial, the prosecution also provided defense counsel with
Swisher’s grand jury testimony containing similar irregularities.76
The trial judge concluded that Hinkson’s attorney had not been
diligent in following any of these leads.77 The trial court also found
the Miller Letter and the Woodring Affidavit to be cumulative of
what had already been offered at trial and that the materials were
offered for the sole purpose of impeaching Swisher.78 The court
concluded that the two documents were excludable under the
Federal Rules of Evidence in that they constituted unfairly
prejudicial evidence (Rule 403) and constituted extrinsic evidence
of specific conduct offered to attack Swisher’s character for
truthfulness (Rule 608(b)).79
On appeal from the district court’s ruling, a Ninth Circuit threejudge panel held that the trial court abused its discretion and
reversed the ruling on the motion for a new trial, but the Ninth
Circuit granted a rehearing en banc.80 An en banc panel
subsequently heard the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s
ruling.81
III. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

72

Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1257-58.
74
Id. at 1258.
75
Id.
76
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1258.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
United States v. Hinkson, 526 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc granted,
547 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2008).
81
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1251.
73
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IDENTIFYING THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The first issue before the en banc court in Hinkson was
identifying the appropriate standard of review. When the issue on
appeal is purely a question of law, the appellate court reviews the
case de novo.82 If the court is to review factual findings, then the
abuse-of-discretion standard is applied.83 But determining the
lens through which an appellate court must analyze the
application of law in the context of a trial court’s factual findings
requires further inquiry into the substance of the issue on review.84
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court
opined that in reviewing a trial court’s factual findings, “the abuseof-discretion
and
clearly
erroneous
standards
are
85
indistinguishable.” A clearly erroneous assessment of the facts
would equate to a trial court abusing its discretion.86 Thus, a court
of appeals may conclude that a district court abused its discretion
in making a factual finding only if the factual finding was clearly
erroneous.87
The Supreme Court in United States v. United States
Gypsum Co. held that, despite evidence supporting the trial
court’s factual finding, an appellate court may still find it clearly
erroneous if the evidence as a whole gives rise to a “definite and a
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”88 Therefore,
under this type of review, an appellate court must ask “‘whether,
on the entire evidence,’ it is ‘left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’”89
However, just a year later, in United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., the Supreme Court concluded that, when the factual
evidence offers two permissible views, a trial court does not
commit clear error in choosing between the two.90 This affords a
trial court greater discretion to adopt one factual conclusion, even
if the weight of the evidence favors another conclusion, so long as
82

United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc),
abrogated on other grounds, Estate of Merchant v. Comm’r, 947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991).
83
Id. at 1200.
84
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1259.
85
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1259 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 405 (1990)).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
89
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (quoting U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at
395).
90
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949).
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there is sufficient evidence to support either conclusion.91 This
ruling contrasted with Gypsum’s authorization for an appellate
court to reverse whenever it develops a “definite and firm
conviction” that the trial court made a mistake.92 Yet, despite
being seemingly contradictory, both Gypsum and Yellow Cab
formulations of the clear-error standard of review have been
subsequently reaffirmed.93
In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina, the
Supreme Court reviewed the Fourth Circuit’s finding that a trial
court committed clear error when it made a factual determination
that a selection committee had skipped over a female candidate
for a position as recreational director on the basis of her gender.94
After weighing the evidence itself, the appellate court found that
the selection committee had not in fact discriminated against the
candidate because she was a woman.95 The Supreme Court
found that both lower courts’ factual determinations were
supported by the facts in the record and neither was “illogical or
implausible.”96 The Court held that, although the Fourth Circuit’s
view was just as permissible as the trial court’s conclusion, judicial
deference in favor of a trial court’s factual findings required
reversal.97 Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that a finding of clear
error is appropriate when the trial court’s factual determination is
“illogical and implausible” or lacks “support in inferences that may
be drawn from facts in the record.”98
The Hinkson court noted that this series of decisions has led
to confusion over when an appellate court should exercise its
power to reverse a trial court’s factual findings. The Ninth Circuit’s
standard prior to Hinkson stated that a trial court “abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law, when it rests its decision
on clearly erroneous factual findings, or when [the appellate court
is] left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment.”99
91

See id.
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1260.
93
Id.; see Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (applying U.S. Gypsum’s
formulation of clear-error standard of review); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 400-01 (1990) (applying definition of “clearly erroneous” that was first articulated in
Yellow Cab).
94
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 571 (1985).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 577.
97
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1261.
98
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 577.
99
United States v. 4.85 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Lincoln County,
92
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But this meant that appellate panels had been left to
themselves to decide whether they had reached a “definite and
firm conviction that [a] mistake [had] been committed,” or whether
a trial court’s factual finding was even “permissible.”100 The
Hinkson majority opined that there were consequently no effective
checks on an appellate court’s power to substitute its own
judgment for that of the district court.101 In Hinkson, the Ninth
Circuit adopted a new objective abuse-of-discretion standard that
attempted to merge the U.S. Gypsum, Yellow Cab, and Anderson
standards into one clear test.102

B.

THE NEW ABUSE-OF-DISCRETION TEST

The new abuse-of-discretion test adopted in Hinkson provides
a two-pronged approach to determining abuse of discretion.103
First, the appellate court should look to whether the district court
identified the correct legal standard; if the district court failed to do
so, then it abused its discretion.104 Second, the appellate court
must determine whether the trial court’s application of the correct
legal standard was (1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without
support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the
record; if any of these three applies, then the trial court abused its
discretion by making a clearly erroneous finding of fact.105
1.

Whether the Appropriate Legal Standard Was Applied

The United States Supreme Court has held that a district
court abuses its discretion if it makes an “error of law.”106 Here,
the district court denied Hinkson’s new-trial motion.107 By applying
the Harrington test, the district court identified and applied the
Mont., 546 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1251 (citing 4.85 Acres of Land, 546 F.3d at 617).
101
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1251.
102
Id. at 1261.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1261-62.
105
Id. at 1262-63.
106
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1261 (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
405 (1990)).
107
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1257.
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relevant law related to a motion for a new trial.108 The Harrington
test requires a criminal defendant seeking a new trial to prove (1)
the evidence is newly discovered, (2) the defendant was diligent in
seeking the evidence, (3) the evidence is material to the issues at
trial, (4) the evidence is not (a) cumulative or (b) merely
impeaching, and (5) the evidence indicates the defendant would
probably be acquitted in a new trial.109 If the issue on appeal is
“essentially factual,” then the issue becomes whether the district
court’s findings of fact, and its application of those findings of fact
to the rule of law were illogical, implausible, or without support in
inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record.110
The Hinkson court concluded that the substance of Hinkson’s
appeal was one that was “essentially factual.”111 The question
here did not turn on the definition or determination of legal
concepts.112 Rather, the district court’s decision to deny the newtrial motion rested on the factual events that occurred at trial and
the factual value of Hinkson’s newly discovered evidence.113 As a
result, the Ninth Circuit turned to the question of whether the
district court’s findings of fact and its application of the Harrington
factors to the facts were illogical, implausible, or lacking in support
from the record.114
2.

Illogical, Implausible, or Lacking in Support from the Record

The Hinkson majority held that the district court did not err in
finding that the evidence offered in Hinkson’s motion for a new
trial was not newly discovered.115 The majority found that,
although the Miller and Woodring affidavits were newly written,
they offered nothing new beyond what was known at trial.116
Instead, the affidavits merely supported evidence that was
deemed inadmissible at trial.117 Therefore, the en banc panel
concluded that the trial court’s determination that the evidence
108

Id. at 1264.
United States v. Harrington, 410 F.3d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 2005).
110
United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc),
abrogated on other grounds by Estate of Merchant v. Comm’r, 947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.
1991).
111
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1264.
112
Id. at 1259.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 1264.
115
Id.
116
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1264.
117
Id.
109
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was not “newly discovered” was logical and plausible.118
The Hinkson court also concluded that the trial court’s
determination that Hinkson’s attorney failed to exercise due
diligence in discovery was logical, plausible, and based on
inferences supported by the record.119 The court noted that
Hinkson’s lawyer admitted to conducting an investigation of
Swisher’s military record for “quite some time.”120 In fact, months
prior to the trial, current counsel represented Hinkson in a civil trial
against Swisher.121 In a civil deposition, Swisher mentioned his
service in the Korean War, a war that occurred when he was too
young to enlist in the armed forces.122 Similar statements made
by Swisher were also found in grand jury transcripts provided to
defense counsel.123 The trial court also noted the months that
passed between Swisher’s first cross-examination and the
procurement of the affidavits, and that Hinkson’s counsel failed to
ask for a continuance.124 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that no clear
error occurred in the trial court’s determination that defense
counsel failed to exercise due diligence.125
Similarly, the Hinkson court noted that the district court was
well within its traditional powers of discretion when it determined
that the evidence being offered was collateral and immaterial to
the issues at trial.126 The relevant issue was what Swisher had
told Hinkson.127 The trial court determined that the evidence of
Swisher’s actual military service record (or lack thereof) would
have confused or misled the jury as to the relevant issues.128 The
trial court also determined that authenticating and explaining the
documents would cause an unreasonable delay.129
Finally, the Hinkson court held that the district court did not
err in ruling that the evidence would not result in an acquittal at retrial.130 The district court opined that the affidavits would prove
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only that Swisher lied about his military service.131 The collateral
nature of this evidence would make it inadmissible under Rule 403
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the outcome of the trial
would not change.132 Therefore, the Hinkson court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion, because this factual
determination was based on reasonable inferences from the
facts.133
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court
identified the correct legal standard to analyze Hinkson’s motion
for a new trial and the court’s findings of fact, and that the district
court’s application of the correct legal standard to those findings of
fact was not illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences
that could be drawn from the facts in the record.134 Therefore, the
Hinkson court ruled that the district court had not abused its
discretion in denying Hinkson’s new-trial motion.135
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
By applying the new objective test for an abuse-of-discretion
determination, the Hinkson majority stated that it was simply
clarifying the existing standard.136 However, the new objective
two-part test offers definite direction for future Ninth Circuit
adjudications. In fact, in the two months following the decision,
U.S. v. Hinkson was cited by twenty-one Ninth Circuit decisions
and many more briefs by counsel.137
Litigants may have to be more creative in persuading
appellate courts that particular factual findings are illogical,
implausible, or without support in inferences from the facts in the
record. The Hinkson majority made only cursory reference to
these three terms and failed to shine any new light onto what
kinds of findings would fit these descriptions. It is likely that
subsequent cases will be required to fill in the lines drawn by
United States v. Hinkson.
Focus will once again be placed on the “main event” of the
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trial.138 Litigants will be forced to concentrate their efforts and
energies on the trial and convincing the trier of fact that their
version of the events is right.139 Judicial resources will be
conserved in that only the trial court will be burdened with
duplicative and lengthy factual determinations.140
One outcome from Hinkson is certain: it will afford more
deference to the trial courts in their factual findings and the
application of those facts to law. By announcing this new test, the
Hinkson court was clear as to what level of deference appellate
courts should afford trial courts in similar cases in the future.
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